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ABSTRACT
There is a need to improve surveillance systems in order to recognise emerging threats, both in the
community and in hospitals, in a timely manner. The laboratory arm of surveillance must be
complemented by hospital and primary care components. We also need more training at all levels:
undergraduate and postgraduate medical training, specialist training, as well as continuing professional
development schemes. Core training programmes for infectious disease specialists and medical
microbiologists must be established. The contribution of general practitioners, infection specialists,
microbiology laboratories, and public health specialists ⁄ agencies to response systems should be deﬁned
as clearly as possible and should be either empirically based or derived from scenario-guided calamity
models. The success of surveillance hinges on sufﬁcient long-term resources and dedicated coordina-
tion. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) may assume this role. However,
structural and administrative constraints of the diverse healthcare systems throughout Europe may
represent an impediment to a harmonised response. Also, the funding of the ECDC cannot cover the
operational demands. The ECDC may well work as a small coordinating unit; however, without a
laboratory-based scientiﬁc status, it remains doubtful whether the ECDC will achieve the competence
and authority needed for effective leadership in healthcare. The ESCMID, together with other national
and international scientiﬁc societies, should put emphasis on the fact that infectious diseases have not
received the necessary degree of attention from governments in the European region. The ESCMID
should strengthen its role in harmonising and supporting the highest standards of training in the
infection disciplines.
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INTRODUCTION
Looking at life on earth with the eyes of an
evolutionary ecologist, one cannot but notice that,
among the larger mammals, no species is more
abundant, more crowded, more exposed and
more mobile than humans. This means that the
human population currently represents the
largest ecological opportunity for transmissible
pathogens, which entails the worrying prospect of
large-scale outbreaks of infectious diseases. To
predict, however, when and where new infectious
diseases will emerge is impossible, and forecast-
ing the dynamics of existing and re-emerging
diseases involves huge uncertainties. This global
insecurity is underlined by the de novo emergence
and outbreaks in recent history of severe acute
respiratory syndrome, avian inﬂuenza, West Nile
virus infections, foot and mouth disease, and
bovine spongiform encephalopathy crisis in the
mid-1990s. Governments in Europe seem to share
this concern, but it appears that the dimension of
the potential health threat is not matched by the
funding necessary for preparedness.
The ESCMID is the leading professional organi-
sation for medical microbiology and the infectious
disease speciality in Europe, and undertakes
regular consultation with the various stakeholders
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in public health in order to determine what is
needed to meet the challenges in the ﬁeld of
infectious diseases in the coming years. On the
occasion of the ESCMID workshop ‘Progress
towards Meeting the Challenges in Microbiology
and Infectious Diseases’, participants from 24
countries, including delegates from the World
Health Organization (WHO), from two Directo-
rates of the European Commission (Directorate
General for Public Health and Consumer Protec-
tion and Directorate General for Research) and
from the European Union of Medical Specialists
addressed the public health challenges by
attempting to answer seven pertinent questions
that centred around the awareness, preparedness,
scope of activities and necessary responses to the
emerging and prevalent infectious disease threats
in Europe. In the following, a consensus view of
the delegates is given.
HOW TO IMPROVE SURVEILLANCE
SYSTEMS TO RECOGNISE
EMERGING THREATS IN THE
COMMUNITY AND IN HOSPITALS IN
A TIMELY MANNER
For effective identiﬁcation of infectious disease
threats, efﬁcient surveillance structures must be
in place. Surveillance programmes should be
guided by clear objectives, with the focus on
protecting or improving the health of European
citizens. In considering improvement, the only
questions that should be asked are those for
which the answers lend themselves to tangible
public health gains. The simplest conceivable
surveillance structure would be laboratory-based,
and should include a minimum data set identiﬁed
by a catalogue of diseases, organisms and case
deﬁnitions, which must take into account national
priorities. Accession countries from eastern and
central Europe face different infectious disease
threats from the countries in the west. With faster
disease diffusion brought about by free move-
ment, trade and travel, surveillance systems in
western European countries must adjust to these
new demands. Standardisation and external qual-
ity assurance are important aspects of the sur-
veillance cycle, in order to improve the speciﬁcity
of the recorded information. However, attempts
to achieve standardisation, harmonisation and
speciﬁcity should not deter or exclude the partici-
pation of potential surveillance partners, as qual-
ity improvement of data is an ongoing process
and can be achieved en route. At the same time,
surveillance systems must also be sensitive to
syndromes that lack in-vitro correlates but reﬂect
clinical entities or may indeed represent new and
unprecedented health events. It can thus be
expected that no single approach will be sufﬁ-
cient, and the laboratory arm of surveillance must
to be complemented by hospital and primary care
components.
Hospital-based surveillance systems must be
governed by the same principles that guide the
choice of those implemented for community-
acquired infections. Efforts that directly inform
infection control measures should be prioritised.
Most of the active (and, in fact, most work-
intensive) surveillance should thus be targeted at
types of infections that are more likely to be
‘controllable’, such as those caused by organisms
with unstable equilibrium prevalence in hospi-
tals. Feedback to the hospital practitioners is an
essential component of surveillance, to complete
the audit cycle. In Europe, different approaches
to conﬁdentiality have been identiﬁed. Most
national surveillance systems follow the national
nosocomial infection surveillance system of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the
USA and inform individual hospitals on their
infection rates with respect to the overall national
distribution in a conﬁdential manner. Recent
legislation in the UK obliges hospitals to provide
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus propor-
tions from blood culture isolates, which become
accessible on a named basis to the public. It is
clear that this type of information does not
exactly reﬂect the quality of care provided by
individual institutions as long as control for
major confounders such as patient mix, disease
severity and frequency of complicated interven-
tions has not been carried out. Moreover, obliga-
tory surveillance with construction of league
tables introduces a differential set of bias, which
differs from the bias inherent in voluntary
reporting. The preferred structure for hospital
surveillance and data feedback is a matter of
debate and depends on the information desired.
Vital for any scheme, however, is maintenance of
conﬁdence on the part of all network participants
in the quality of data. At the same time, more
efforts should bemade to respond to the legitimate
demand of the public for access to information
about the risks of healthcare-associated infections.
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HOW TO EFFECTIVELY MONITOR
THE BURDEN OF INFECTIOUS
DISEASE AND ANTIMICROBIAL
RESISTANCE
Assessing the disease burden is a different objec-
tive and not a necessary component of any
surveillance system. The usefulness of parameter
estimation on the basis of widely available routine
data should be evaluated with respect to in-depth
epidemiological modelling for determining the
burden of infectious diseases acquired in the
community or in hospitals. These efforts to
identify the human and economic costs of infec-
tions caused by antibiotic-resistant pathogens also
appear to be beyond the remit of surveillance
systems but represent a research question that
must be urgently addressed.
WHAT ARE THE NEEDS OF GENERAL
PRACTITIONERS , INFECTION
SPECIALISTS , MICROBIOLOGY
LABORATORIES AND PUBLIC
HEALTH SPECIALISTS ⁄ AGENCIES
FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE
SURVEILLANCE AND ALERT FOR
EMERGING OUTBREAKS?
Mixed-structure surveillance systems rely very
much on individual competence if early warning
signs are to be identiﬁed. The epidemiological
knowledge of healthcare providers, as well as the
diagnostic specialist, is an important part of the
skill mix. Room for improvement of the degree of
competence in this area has been identiﬁed with
respect to care and service providers for infec-
tious diseases. Curative and diagnostic approa-
ches in clinical practice are centred on individual
patients for the beneﬁt of the population. In the
context of public health this concept is, however,
reversed, and efforts are directed at the popula-
tion to beneﬁt the individual. It is therefore
necessary to convey this alternative view more
effectively through proper training at all levels,
including training of undergraduate medical stu-
dents and postgraduate master students, training
of specialists and training within continuing
professional development schemes. Core training
programmes for infectious disease specialists and
medical microbiologists devised by the European
Board of Infectious Diseases and the European
Union of Medical Specialists Section for Biopa-
thology have not taken these demands into full
account. Public health agencies, on the other
hand, must have staff members with sufﬁcient
clinical experience and laboratory expertise in
order to identify the information required by
healthcare practitioners, and to engage in a
fruitful dialogue with them in order to improve
the feedback and use of pertinent surveillance
data.
WHAT SHOULD BE THE
CONTRIBUTION OF GENERAL
PRACTITIONERS, INFECTION
SPECIALISTS , MICROBIOLOGY
LABORATORIES AND PUBLIC
HEALTH SPECIALISTS ⁄ AGENCIES
TO RESPONSE SYSTEMS FOR THE
CONTROL OF OUTBREAKS OF
INFECTIOUS DISEASES?
Useful contributions to outbreak control efforts
require an effective organisational structure and a
set of simple predeﬁned skills. Infectious disease
specialists and public health agencies are not
accustomed to these types of demands. Large
gaps still exist in the capacity to respond to major
outbreaks of infectious diseases, as was clearly
revealed by the recent management of the severe
acute respiratory syndrome threat. Much could be
learned from specialists in disaster relief who are
dealing with calamities in developing countries.
Expanded training programmes such as the
European Commission (EC)-supported European
Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Train-
ing (EPIET) programme for ﬁeld epidemiologists
represent one way of ﬁlling this gap. A catalogue
of functions should be developed for each player
in the infection prevention and control pro-
gramme. The role of response should be deﬁned
as clearly as possible and either empirically based
or derived from scenario-guided calamity models.
DO WE NEED IMPROVED
COOPERATION BETWEEN THESE
PLAYERS FOR THEIR INTEGRATION
INTO COMMON ORGANISATIONS
AT THE LOCAL, NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LEVELS? WHAT
ARE THE ‘BEST-PRACTICE MODELS’?
The success of surveillance and response activities
largely hinges on proper long-term resources and
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dedicated coordination. This has been learned
from some of the well-functioning ‘disease-speci-
ﬁc networks’ funded by the EC. Member states of
the European Union (EU) have understood that a
coordinated approach at the European level lacks
the leadership of a common and accepted insti-
tute. As a consequence, European Council and
Parliament decisions have now paved the way for
a European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control (ECDC) that will assume exactly this role.
However, structural and administrative con-
straints of the diverse healthcare systems
throughout Europe may represent an impediment
to a harmonised response in the case of an
international outbreak. Another consequence of
cultural diversity may be the discrepancy among
nations in their capacity to prevent and control
large-scale events with a public health impact. It
therefore appears necessary to systematically
determine each country’s ability to cope with
large-scale events via an inventory of the national
surveillance and response capacity and a test of
their operational effectiveness during interna-
tional calamity exercises. Such exercises should
identify the gaps in concerted responses and
should provide a score by which the abilities of
national public health systems can be evaluated.
The results of this assessment should be made
public, and should provide the basis for bench-
marking by the EC.
WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF THE
ECDC IN THE COORDINATION AND
SUPPORT OF NATIONAL PUBLIC
HEALTH POLICIES FOR THE
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF
INFECTIOUS DISEASES? SHOULD
THIS CENTRE OPERATE AS A SMALL
COORDINATION OFFICE OR
SHOULD IT INCORPORATE
REFERENCE LABORATORY
FACILITIES AND A NOVEL
RESEARCH ORGANISATION?
Article 3 of the regulations of the European
Parliament and of the Council establishing the
ECDC describes the mission of the centre. In
paragraph 2, it reads: ‘Within the ﬁeld of its
mission, the Centre shall: (a) search for, collect,
evaluate and disseminate relevant scientiﬁc and
technical data; (b) provide scientiﬁc opinions and
scientiﬁc and technical assistance including
training; (c) provide timely information to the
Commission, the Member States, Community
agencies and international organizations active
within the ﬁeld of public health; (d) coordinate the
European networking of bodies operating in the
ﬁelds within the Centre’s mission, including net-
works arising from public health activities sup-
ported by the Commission and operating the
dedicated surveillance networks; and (e) exchange
information, expertise and best practices, and
facilitate the development and implementation of
joint actions.’
Several threats with regard to the organisa-
tional capacity of the ECDC become clear when
contrasting the mission statement with other
sources of information. Funding for the ECDC
until 2008 is provided by the EC through the
2003–2008 programme on community action in
the ﬁeld of public health. It is foreseeable that this
funding will not cover the operational demand
should all aims covered by the mission statement
be accomplished. Three hundred and ﬁfty million
euros have been earmarked by the EU for the
2003–2008 programme, which supplies co-ﬁnan-
cing not only for the dedicated surveillance
networks for health threats and infectious dis-
eases but also for many other types of public
health initiatives, from chronic to lifestyle-associ-
ated diseases. On the ﬁnancial scale, it becomes
clear that consumer health and protection is not a
priority of European governments, which spend
annually in EU programs only 0.18 euros per
capita for public health and 25 euros of agricul-
tural subsidies per head of cattle.
When the number of tasks is reduced to a
minimum, however, the ECDC may well work as
a small coordinating unit. It would be able to
identify existing expertise among the national
institutes and thus distribute the tasks to special-
ists while keeping overall organisational control,
thereby streamlining the efforts targeted at health
threats. Effective fulﬁlment of this role depends
on the willingness of national institutes to support
the requests issued by the ECDC. There is no
doubt that in cases of international emergencies,
national institutes are supportive and will pro-
vide their expertise for this common goal. It will
undoubtedly be more difﬁcult to coordinate
efforts targeted at endemic diseases. Here, the
ECDC’s requests may meet with more resistance
if it has difﬁculties in offering the necessary
co-funding, considering the tight ﬁnancial
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constraints under which academic and national
institutes operate.
At the present stage of planning of the ECDC, it
is not expected that there will be any laboratory
facilities. This curtails the ability of the ECDC to
provide scientiﬁc opinions and scientiﬁc and
technical assistance, including training, as stipu-
lated in the mission statement, unless scientiﬁc
and technical expertise are be restricted to epi-
demiology and data management alone. It will
also not allow for the provision of reference data
or the execution of quality assurance exercises.
Most importantly, the restriction to data analysis
only will preclude the ability to generate genuine
research results based on in-vitro experiments.
Without a laboratory-based scientiﬁc status, it
remains doubtful whether the ECDC will achieve
the competence and authority needed for effective
leadership in concerted disease prevention and
control efforts.
Moreover, there is a threat in the form of
administrative and bureaucratic hurdles. The
mission statement clearly states that, in the case
of outbreaks of illness of unknown origin that
may spread within or to the EU, the ECDC should
act on its own initiative until the source of the
outbreak is known. Nonetheless, the director and
staff are accountable to a management board and
will be guided by an Advisory Forum; together,
these contain twice as many individuals as are
working in the ECDC.
WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF
SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES SUCH AS
THE ESCMID IN THE PREVENTION
AND CONTROL OF INFECTIOUS
DISEASES?
It is the role of the ESCMID to promote and sup-
port infection professionals throughout Europe.
With this remit in mind, it is clear that the
ESCMID is dedicated to providing the necessary
advocacy for the priorities set out in this article.
The ESCMID, together with other national and
international scientiﬁc societies, should emphasise
the fact that infectious diseases, although recog-
nised as a threat to European citizens, have not
received the necessary degree of attention from
governments in the European region. This lack of
attention is in stark contrast to other areas of EU
collaboration, such as free trade and agriculture,
and poses a risk to the wellbeing of a large
segment of the population in Europe. The ESC-
MID should strengthen its role in harmonising
and supporting the highest standards of training
in the infection disciplines. Not only has infec-
tious disease epidemiology been identiﬁed as a
neglected ﬁeld in most curricula, but basic train-
ing in microbiology, infectious diseases and infec-
tion control as a whole is declining throughout
European medical schools. This is a worrying
trend. Continuing medical education and special
professional development schemes must be
devised to address the training needs for effective
participation in epidemiological surveillance and
outbreak control interventions. Thereby, the ESC-
MID could bridge the gaps between the different
specialties involved in the management of infec-
tious diseases from the bedside to population-
based intervention. The ESCMID represents a
unique partner that could serve as a forum for
improving coherence, comprehensiveness and
concerted action, and function as the advocate
for infection disciplines that is needed today more
then ever before.
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